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1. Introduction 
The year 2015 has been a powerful reminder that mi-
grants will take desperate and extraordinary measures 
to try to reach Europe. In light of the tragic deaths of 
thousands of migrants in the Mediterranean in early 
2015, the European Commission restated the argu-
ment that it has made since the early 2000s: one of the 
key factors for the EU to achieve its migration policy 
objectives is cooperation with non-EU countries on mi-
gration issues (Commission, 2015a, p. 5). To facilitate 
such cooperation, policy instruments have been creat-
ed and brought together under the Global Approach to 
Migration and Mobility (Commission, 2011), and pro-
ject funding has been made available under successive 
EU funding instruments. This has spawned a sizeable 
literature on EU external migration policy, with schol-
ars examining policy content and policy-making dynam-
ics (e.g. Boswell, 2003; Coleman, 2009; Weinar, 2011). 
And yet at the same time the literature on implemen-
tation of EU external migration policy has remained ex-
tremely limited (Wunderlich, 2013a; 2013b; 2012). This 
is puzzling, and unsatisfactory. Implementation re-
search matters because “putting a piece of legislation or 
a government programme into practice does not hap-
pen automatically, nor is it a purely technical or apoliti-
cal affair” (Treib, 2006, p. 5). Implementation research in 
EU external migration policy matters because the policy 
area is so salient, and it is therefore important for policy-
makers to understand how this policy works in practice. 
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This article represents a first step in this direction, by 
providing an initial conceptual assessment of implemen-
tation dynamics in the EU’s Mobility Partnerships and 
advancing a future research agenda. The Mobility Part-
nerships are selected as the object of study because 
they are the “main strategic, comprehensive and long-
term cooperation framework for migration management 
with third countries” (Council, 2009, p. 61). 
Section 2 introduces the Mobility Partnership in-
strument and argues that a definitive assessment of 
policy success/failure, in terms of goal realisation, is 
premature. Instead, the article focuses on implementa-
tion dynamics, in order to discern what we might expect 
from the process of implementing Mobility Partnerships. 
Section 3 develops a comprehensive analytical frame-
work based on the public policy literature on imple-
mentation, and section 4 explains the methodology 
underlying the article. The analytical framework is ap-
plied in section 5. The conclusion argues that frame-
works for assessing implementation will need to be 
adapted when used for studying “new” policy tools, 
and that future research on implementation of EU ex-
ternal migration policy should adopt a critical, human 
rights-centred approach. 
2. The “Mobility” Partnerships 
The concept of Mobility Partnerships was introduced 
by the European Commission in 2007 (Commission, 
2007). The central idea is that legal migration opportu-
nities will be offered to non-EU countries in return for 
their cooperation on preventing irregular migration; in 
practice, this has come to mean that Mobility Partner-
ships include the signature of both readmission and vi-
sa facilitation agreements (Commission, 2011, p. 11). 
This “quid pro quo” is significant, and the fact that the 
communication setting out the Mobility Partnership 
concept also addresses circular migration seems to 
emphasise the centrality of “mobility” for this policy in-
strument. To date, Mobility Partnerships have been 
signed with Moldova (2008), Cape Verde (2008), Geor-
gia (2009), Armenia (2011), Morocco (2013), Azerbaijan 
(2013), Tunisia (2014) and Jordan (2014). 
Mobility Partnerships are signed as political decla-
rations, and appended to this declaration is a list of 
projects for implementation; projects may be proposed 
by any of the parties to a Mobility Partnership (the 
Commission, the non-EU country, or participating 
member states), but in reality most projects have been 
carried out by member states (Reslow, 2013, p. 138). A 
Mobility Partnership is best understood as an “umbrel-
la”, bringing together the various individual projects. 
Participation by member states is voluntary, which has 
led to varied patterns of opting in and out by the dif-
ferent member states, ranging from France (which par-
ticipates in all partnerships) to Austria, Croatia, Finland, 
Ireland and Malta (which do not participate in any 
partnerships so far). All other member states are locat-
ed somewhere between these extremes, participating 
in some, but not all, partnerships. 
Once a Mobility Partnership has been negotiated 
and signed, it is implemented through the implementa-
tion of the projects proposed. Implementation is moni-
tored at the EU level through a Mobility Partnership 
task force, and in the non-EU country through a coop-
eration platform. A Mobility Partnership task force 
consists of representatives of the Commission and par-
ticipating member states (Lavenex & Stucky, 2011, p. 
134). The Commission plays a key role by organising 
meetings and updating the “scoreboard”—a document 
produced for each individual Mobility Partnership 
which shows all the projects being implemented and 
their state of play. The scoreboard for the Mobility 
Partnership with Moldova is available online (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Re-
public of Moldova, 2015), but the other scoreboards 
are not publically available. On the ground, member 
states’ embassies, EU delegations and non-EU coun-
tries’ authorities meet in the framework of cooperation 
platforms to monitor implementation (Commission, 
2009a, pp. 5-6). International organisations and NGOs 
also play a role in the implementation of Mobility Part-
nerships: the International Organisation for Migration 
(IOM), for example, has supported the implementation 
of the development-related components of the Mobili-
ty Partnership with Moldova, and both IOM and the In-
ternational Centre for Migration Policy Development 
(ICMPD) implement the visa liberalisation action plan 
in Georgia (Commission, 2014a, p. 3). 
The literature on the implementation of EU exter-
nal migration policy is extremely limited. Initial aca-
demic assessments of the Mobility Partnerships have 
focused on the decision-making process. Member 
states “wrangle” amongst themselves to ensure that 
EU policy favours non-EU countries with which they 
have a special relationship (Parkes, 2009, p. 343). At 
the same time, they maintain strict control over the 
form and content of the Mobility Partnerships, thus se-
verely limiting the Commission’s room for manoeuvre 
(Reslow, 2013, p. 229). The exclusion of the European 
Parliament from the policy-making process has “mar-
ginalised any sort of democratic accountability” of this 
policy instrument (Carrera & Hernández i Sagrera, 
2011, p. 106). Mobility Partnerships can also be con-
sidered “insecurity partnerships” because “they un-
dermine the coherence of EU policy on labour immigra-
tion and increase the vulnerability of third country 
workers’ human rights in Europe” (p. 97).  
Despite their name and the centrality of the idea of 
mobility as put forward by the Commission (see 
above), several authors argue that labour mobility 
schemes have been lacking in the Mobility Partnerships 
concluded to date (Carrera & Hernández i Sagrera, 
2011; Lavenex & Stucky, 2011; Parkes, 2009; Reslow, 
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2013). These judgements are based on a reading of the 
Mobility Partnership texts only, and the actual status of 
mobility in the outcomes of the Mobility Partnerships is 
uncertain: due to their non-binding nature, full imple-
mentation of the proposed projects on mobility cannot 
be guaranteed (Carrera & Hernández i Sagrera, 2011, p. 
110). On the other hand, new projects on mobility may 
be added later, that were not originally foreseen.  
Ideally an assessment of the process of implemen-
tation would be based on the scoreboard for each Mo-
bility Partnership. However, these are not made publi-
cally available, so it is difficult to assess the state and 
progress of implementation. An alternative option is to 
judge the outcome of Mobility Partnerships in terms of 
their contribution to mobility, based on the (at least 
nominal) importance attached to this concept in the 
original Commission communication, and the rather 
sceptical initial assessments by scholars. Figure 1 below 
shows the number of first residence permits issued to 
citizens of Mobility Partnership countries, and Figure 2 
shows the number of short-stay visas issued to citizens 
of Mobility Partnership countries. From Figure 1 it is 
clear that none of the Mobility Partnership countries 
has seen a consistent and significant increase in the 
number of residence permits being issued. This implies 
that Mobility Partnerships are actually not contributing 
to mobility, although other factors (particularly eco-
nomic) may also affect mobility entirely separately of 
the Mobility Partnerships. The data on which Figure 2 
is based is only available for 2010–2013; however, visa 
facilitation agreements are usually agreed after the Mo-
bility Partnerships have been signed, meaning ratification 
and implementation are on-going or at an early stage.1 
It is therefore not possible to definitively determine 
the contribution of Mobility Partnerships to mobility: 
mobility is affected by numerous other factors; and the 
implementation of important instruments, such as visa 
facilitation agreements, are still at an early stage. De-
finitive assessments of implementation success/failure 
may take years because of the data and evidence re-
quired to make such an assessment (Ripley & Franklin, 
1982, p. 203). This article will therefore apply the liter-
ature on implementation in a “backward” fashion: in-
stead of beginning from an observed successful/failed 
policy implementation and tracing this back to the im-
plementation dynamics, the article conducts a concep-
tual analysis of the implementation dynamics in order to 
determine what we can expect in the future from the 
implementation of the Mobility Partnerships. As this ap-
proach is ambivalent regarding the final outcome of im-
plementation, it avoids the accusation commonly lev-
elled at implementation scholars that they focus too 
much on policy failures (DeLeon, 1999, p. 329). The fol-
lowing section develops an analytical framework based 
on the public policy literature on implementation. 
                                                          
1 The visa facilitation agreements with Armenia and Azerbai-
jan entered into force in 2014, and the visa facilitation 
agreement with Cape Verde has still to be ratified. 
 
Figure 1. Number of residence permits issued by the EU 28 member states to citizens of Mobility Partnership countries 
(source: Eurostat). The data concerns residence permits issued for more than 3 months, for all purposes. Eurostat data 
is currently only available up to 2013; Morocco, Azerbaijan, Tunisia and Jordan are therefore not included, as their Mo-
bility Partnerships were agreed in 2013 and 2014. 
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Figure 2. Number of short-stay visas issued to citizens of Mobility Partnership countries (source: Commission, 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/visa-policy/index_en.htm; author’s own 
calculations). The data does not include the UK, Ireland or Croatia; data for Romania, Bulgaria and Cyprus is patchy; and 
the data concerns visas issued by location of member states’ embassies, not according to citizenship of the person re-
ceiving the visa. 
3. Defining and Assessing Implementation 
It is important to firstly define what is meant by im-
plementation. This is especially so given that some au-
thors writing on EU external migration policy claim to 
analyse “implementation” whilst actually studying de-
cision-making or policy-making. Wunderlich (2012, p. 
1423), for instance, examines why Morocco and 
Ukraine “have agreed to co-operation on illegal migra-
tion”, and highlights the concerns of Moroccan and 
Ukrainian actors concerning migration flows and the 
requirements of an EU readmission agreement. His 
analysis therefore concerns broader processes motivat-
ing these governments’ decisions and relationship with 
the EU, but not how the implementation of specific 
projects is functioning. It may be difficult to draw a firm 
distinction between policy-making and policy imple-
mentation, as implementation processes feed into pol-
icy formation in an iterative process of feedback and 
evaluation (Hill & Hupe, 2002, p. 139; Nakamura, 
1987). Nevertheless, this article differentiates between 
the process leading up to the signature of individual 
Mobility Partnerships (decision-making) and everything 
that happens afterwards (implementation). 
The literature on the implementation of EU exter-
nal migration policy to date is very limited. Wunderlich 
has adopted three different analytical approaches: fol-
lowing the work of Matland (1995) and focussing on 
the role of conflict and policy ambiguity in the imple-
mentation process (2013a); focussing on coherence be-
tween the objectives of different policy components 
(2013b); and following an organisational perspective 
which holds that implementation dynamics depend on 
the perception of the policy problem, the macro-
political context, and organisational factors such as 
administrative capacity and overlap between existing 
organisational structures and policy objectives (2012). 
This article develops a comprehensive framework for 
assessing implementation dynamics, based on an ex-
tensive review of the public policy literature on imple-
mentation. It therefore brings together these and oth-
er factors for a broader view of implementation. 
It is necessary to differentiate “implementation” 
from the notions of “impact” or “policy effectiveness”. 
“Impact” refers to the consequences of a policy deci-
sion (i.e. “what happened”) and ‘implementation’ re-
fers to the dynamics and factors which explain pro-
gramme performance (i.e. “why did it happen in this 
way”). Policy impact is therefore the extent to which 
policy objectives were achieved, and implementation 
studies examine the factors contributing to this realisa-
tion/non-realisation of policy objectives (Van Meter & 
Van Horn, 1975, p. 448). This article focuses on imple-
mentation dynamics.  
The analytical framework in this article is based on 
the public policy literature, because the literature on 
EU compliance suffers from the problem that it has fo-
cussed extensively on the implementation of EU legis-
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lation (e.g. Bursens, 2002; Hartlapp, 2007; Skjærseth & 
Wettestad, 2008). This is problematic for EU external 
migration policy for two main reasons: firstly, EU ex-
ternal migration policy is not based on legislation, and 
little of it is legally-binding (apart from readmission and 
visa facilitation agreements, which are international 
agreements). It is thus futile to look for evidence of 
member states adopting supportive national legisla-
tion. Secondly, focusing on EU legislation reduces im-
plementation to an internal EU affair and a matter of 
the dynamics at play between the EU institutions and 
the member states, and within the member states’ na-
tional administrations. Implementation of EU external 
migration policy, however, relies on non-EU countries, 
and their role must also be considered in order to 
reach a comprehensive understanding of implementa-
tion processes (Wunderlich, 2013a, p. 409).  
The public policy literature on implementation has 
highlighted a number of factors required for successful 
policy implementation. These factors draw on both the 
top-down perspective (those factors that central poli-
cy-makers can control) and the bottom-up perspective 
(those factors outside the control of central policy-
makers). Although the article does not engage with the 
“top-down versus bottom-up” debate within imple-
mentation research (see e.g. Matland, 1995), it draws 
mainly on the work of the scholars writing from the 
top-down perspective. This choice is made because the 
focus here is on a particular policy instrument (cf. Sa-
batier, 1986, p. 37). 
Successful policy implementation depends firstly on 
the tractability of the problem being addressed: there 
must be a clear understanding of the link between the 
problem and the solutions which can address this prob-
lem, and existing practices causing the problem should 
not be diverse (Goggin, Bowman, Lester & O’Toole, 
1990, p. 35; Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980, pp. 541-544; 
Wunderlich, 2012, p. 1418).  
Secondly, successful policy implementation is more 
likely if the new policy does not deviate substantially 
from previous policies: “incremental changes are more 
likely to engender a positive response than will drastic 
ones” (cf. Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980, p. 543; 
Skjærseth & Wettestad, 2008, p. 277; Wunderlich, 
2012, p. 1419; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975, p. 458). 
Knill and Lenschow (2000, p. 32) refer to a “bounded 
space for innovation”, which is the fine line between 
requiring “something, but not too much”. 
Thirdly, policy objectives which are clear and are 
ranked in terms of their relative importance are more 
likely to be successfully implemented (Goggin, Bow-
man, Lester & O’Toole, 1990, p. 35; Sabatier & Maz-
manian, 1980, p. 545; Wunderlich, 2012). This is com-
plicated for EU external migration policy because the 
various actors involved in implementation are likely to 
have different objectives and priorities (Wunderlich, 
2013b, p. 28). 
Fourthly, implementing agencies must have finan-
cial and organisational resources (meaning an ade-
quate number of skilled staff) available to ensure suc-
cessful implementation (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980, 
p. 545; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975, p. 471).  
Fifthly, successful implementation is more likely if 
implementing agencies are integrated in a single hier-
archical structure (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980, p. 
546; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975, pp. 466-467). In po-
litical systems where multiple actors are in charge of 
implementing a single policy, “command from the cen-
tre, control by the centre, and obedience by those 
commanded and controlled” cannot be taken for 
granted (Ripley & Franklin, 1982, p. 188). This is not 
surprising given that these political systems (like the 
United States federal structure and the European Un-
ion) were designed to limit the authority of central 
government (Hill & Hupe, 2002, p. 72). The degree of 
hierarchical integration amongst implementing agen-
cies depends on the number of actors who have the 
opportunity to prevent policy objectives being 
achieved, and on the availability of inducements and 
sanctions to ensure that actors act in accordance with 
policy objectives (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980, p. 546). 
These inducements/sanctions can take various forms: 
the threat of punishment for non-compliance; the 
transfer of knowledge and resources to actors facing 
difficulties complying; and persuading actors to change 
their underlying norms and values (Hartlapp, 2007). 
Sanctions and punishment are most effective when 
there is a direct hierarchical relationship between the 
two sets of actors concerned (Matland, 1995, p. 164). 
Sixthly, the interests and motives of implementing 
officials affect the implementation process (Hill & Hu-
pe, 2002, p. 152; Wunderlich, 2012, p. 1420). Imple-
mentation is more likely to be successful if implement-
ing officials agree with the policy objectives. This can 
be ensured by their inclusion in the policy-making pro-
cess (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980, p. 547; Van Meter 
& Van Horn, 1975, p. 459).  
Finally, the context within which a policy is imple-
mented matters. Economic, social and political condi-
tions can all affect the public and political support for a 
policy. Changing socio-economic conditions can make 
the problem being addressed by the policy relatively 
less important, and thus decrease public and political 
support. Media attention affects the perception of im-
portance of an issue; policies which receive sustained 
media coverage are more likely to be successfully im-
plemented. Public opinion influences the political 
agenda, and so a policy which has high support 
amongst the public and is perceived as being highly sa-
lient is more likely to be successfully implemented. In-
terest groups and elites mobilising in favour of a policy 
also affect implementation (Goggin, Bowman, Lester & 
O’Toole, 1990, p. 39; Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980, pp. 
548-550; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975, pp. 471-472).  
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Section 5 applies the framework outlined above in 
analysing implementation dynamics in EU Mobility 
Partnerships. The following section first explains the 
methodology underlying the article. 
4. Methodology 
Table 1 summarises the analytical framework by show-
ing how each of the factors identified will be applied in 
the analysis in section 5. Given that this article repre-
sents an initial conceptual assessment of implementa-
tion dynamics in the Mobility Partnerships, the analysis 
is based mainly on secondary literature. It also relies on 
documents by the Commission and Council, particularly 
the 2007 Commission communication on Mobility Part-
nerships, the 2009 Commission evaluation of the Mobili-
ty Partnerships, and the texts of the individual partner-
ships. These are the main policy documents relating to 
the Mobility Partnerships which are publically available.  
Table 1. Operationalisation of the analytical framework. 
Factor for successful 
implementation 
Definition 
Tractability of the problem Clear understanding of the 
link between the problem 
and the solutions 
Existing practices causing the 
problem are not diverse 
Nature of change required Policy does not deviate 
substantially from previous 
policies 
Clarity of policy objectives Policy objectives are clear 
Policy objectives are ranked 
in terms of relative 
importance 
Financial and organisational 
resources for 
implementation 
Adequate financial means for 
implementation 
Adequate number of skilled 
staff for implementation 
Relationship between 
implementing agencies 
One actor can force another 
to act in a certain way, 
through 
sanctions/inducements 
Disposition of 
implementing officials 
Implementing officials agree 
with policy objectives 
Implementing officials have 
been included in the policy-
making process 
Implementation context Socio-economic conditions 
are favourable 
Sustained media coverage of 
the policy 
Public opinion is favourable 
Interest groups and elites 
mobilise in favour of the 
policy 
5. Implementation Dynamics in EU Mobility 
Partnerships 
5.1. Tractability of the Problem 
An analysis of EU policy documents suggests that, at 
least within the EU, there is a clear understanding that 
the problem to be addressed is the management of 
migration flows to the EU, and the solution to this 
problem is cooperation with non-EU countries. Since 
the early 2000s, EU policy documents argue that coop-
eration with non-EU countries is the key to preventing 
irregular migration to the EU (e.g. Commission, 2001), 
and that such cooperation needs to be incentivised, for 
instance by linking the signature of readmission 
agreements to visa facilitation agreements (Council, 
2005). However, it is not clear that non-EU countries 
share this view. Cooperating with the EU on the pre-
vention of irregular migration may be coupled with 
high social, political and economic costs (Coleman, 
2009; Ellermann, 2008; Weinar, 2011). For non-EU 
countries the issue is not one of preventing irregular 
emigration, but rather about securing better access for 
their citizens to EU territory.  
Existing practices by member states in the area of 
external migration policy are diverse. France, for in-
stance, has signed agreements with non-EU countries 
on the management of migration flows, which are very 
similar to Mobility Partnerships in that they encompass 
legal migration, visas, readmission, police cooperation, 
reintegration, and development (European Migration 
Network, 2010a, p. 45). The Austrian government, on 
the other hand, implements assisted voluntary return 
programmes and information campaigns about the 
dangers of irregular migration (European Migration 
Network, 2010b), but does not facilitate temporary or 
circular migration to Austria due to the experiences 
with the guest-worker schemes in the 1960s and 
1970s. Whilst the literature on implementation sug-
gests that such diversity will negatively affect policy 
implementation, the voluntary nature of the Mobility 
Partnerships mitigate this: member states whose exist-
ing policy practices do not match well with the Mobility 
Partnership approach can simply choose not to partici-
pate, as is the case with Austria (Reslow, 2013).  
5.2. Nature of Change Required 
Mobility Partnerships sit at the crossroads of migration 
policy and foreign policy. These two policy areas are 
politically sensitive and important to state sovereignty. 
Control over entry into a country’s territory “is often 
seen as one of the last bastions of national sovereign-
ty” (Lavenex, 2011, p. 2). EU migration policy is filled 
with caveats, particularly references to member states’ 
continued competence on entry and residence of third-
country nationals (see e.g. article 1(b) of the Single 
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Permit Directive). Foreign policy is at the core of na-
tional sovereignty, and although member states con-
duct a significant amount of their foreign policy objec-
tives through the EU context, they maintain their own 
distinct priorities, preferences, and privileged relation-
ships with individual non-EU countries. 
A policy instrument requiring any change in this 
nexus between migration policy and foreign policy 
might then be expected to engender opposition. The 
overall objective of the Mobility Partnerships to en-
hance migration opportunities for citizens of the non-
EU country concerned certainly does not seem to fit 
well with the tendency by most member states to-
wards restrictive immigration policies. However, Mobil-
ity Partnerships do not in reality require all that much 
change by member states, given their voluntary nature. 
Member states are free in their choice of which pro-
jects to propose; indeed, despite the overall aim of the 
Mobility Partnerships to combine cooperation on ir-
regular and legal migration, the Mobility Partnerships 
with Moldova, Cape Verde and Georgia did not include 
many projects aiming to create new channels of migra-
tion (Reslow, 2013, p. 138). 
A separate issue concerns the nature of change re-
quired by the other partner in the implementation pro-
cess, namely the non-EU country concerned. This will 
depend on the particular non-EU country. The most 
onerous requirement associated with a Mobility Part-
nership is the signature of a readmission agreement. 
However, with some non-EU countries (like Moldova) a 
readmission agreement already exists before the signa-
ture of a Mobility Partnership. The change required for 
such a country will be less than for a country (like Mo-
rocco) that has been in arduous, drawn-out negotia-
tions with the EU over a readmission agreement for 
several years. 
5.3. Clarity of Policy Objectives 
Although the overall objective of the Mobility Partner-
ships—better legal migration opportunities for non-EU 
countries that commit themselves to cooperating with 
the EU on preventing irregular migration—is relatively 
unambiguous, the Commission communication lists 
many possible types of projects that could fall under a 
Mobility Partnership (see Commission, 2007, pp. 4-8). 
The communication is also rather vague regarding the 
legal nature of Mobility Partnerships, stating only that 
they “will necessarily have a complex legal nature” (p. 
3). It does not rank the different types of projects in 
terms of their relative importance, and does not assign 
more weight to either the commitments by non-EU 
countries on irregular migration or the commitments 
by member states on legal migration.  
The clarity of policy objectives is further compro-
mised by the preamble to each individual Mobility 
Partnership, which states the aims of cooperation. A 
Mobility Partnership is always linked to the existing 
frameworks of cooperation, and this differs amongst 
non-EU countries. In other words, the framing of a 
Mobility Partnership is not fixed but depends on the 
particular non-EU country concerned. In addition, the 
first Mobility Partnerships did not include asylum as 
one of the pillars of cooperation (e.g. Council, 2008), 
but the later Mobility Partnerships do (e.g. Council, 
2013). Overall then, the specific policy objectives are 
too numerous and potentially competing to be defined 
as “clear”. When the sub-goals of a policy are so nu-
merous and varied, disagreement over implementation 
is likely to arise between actors with different training 
(Matland, 1995, p. 169). In the case of the Mobility 
Partnerships, civil servants in interior/justice ministries 
are likely to have different proposals for implementa-
tion than civil servants in foreign ministries (see e.g. 
Pawlak, 2009, p. 37). 
5.4. Financial and Organisational Resources Available 
for Implementation 
A consideration of the financial and organisational re-
sources available for implementation must take place 
across three levels: the EU, the member states, and the 
non-EU country concerned. For the EU level, answers 
need to be sought across a number of institutional set-
tings. In terms of financial resources, the 2014 work 
programme of the EU’s Asylum, Migration and Integra-
tion Fund set aside €3 million specifically to support 
the implementation of the Mobility Partnerships, fo-
cussing on Azerbaijan, Morocco, Jordan and Tunisia 
(Commission, 2014b, p. 11). However, funding for the 
projects carried out within Mobility Partnerships can 
also come from one of the frameworks for cooperation 
with the partner countries concerned, such as the Eu-
ropean Neighbourhood Instrument or the EU’s devel-
opment cooperation budget. In terms of organisational 
resources, DG Migration and Home Affairs plays the 
central role. The Commission’s organisational capacity 
on migration has certainly increased: from only a small 
task force working on justice and home affairs matters 
prior to 1999 (Lavenex, 2009, p. 259), to the creation of 
DG JLS, and the later separation into what is now DG 
Migration and Home Affairs, with a staff of 275 on 1 
January 2014 and 295 on 1 February 2015 (Commis-
sion, 2015b; 2014c). The European External Action Ser-
vice has also become an important actor in EU external 
migration policy, particularly because it controls the EU 
delegations which play an important role in monitoring 
implementation of Mobility Partnerships. However, EU 
officials on the ground “are not necessarily initially 
well-informed and equipped to follow-up on intensified 
and increased activities on migration in the partner 
country or to ensure their articulation with already ex-
isting activities in that field” (Commission, 2009a, p. 6). 
Member states and non-EU countries have differ-
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ent resources available for implementing Mobility 
Partnerships, and it is difficult to draw universal con-
clusions about these capacities. In small member states 
with small administrations, one individual civil servant 
might be responsible for a number of tasks which in a 
larger member state would be shared between several 
people (cf. Engelmann, 2015, p. 211). In newer mem-
ber states, where migration as a policy area is a rela-
tively new phenomenon, experience and expertise 
might be lacking (p. 129). Several member states par-
ticipating in Mobility Partnerships face the problem 
that they are not represented locally by an embassy in 
the country concerned (Lavenex & Stucky, 2011, p. 
136). However, it is not the case that only large/old 
member states are choosing to join the Mobility Part-
nerships; for example, in the Mobility Partnership with 
Azerbaijan, participating member states include Bulgar-
ia, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and 
Slovakia (Council, 2013). Future research should estab-
lish whether there is a causal link between member 
states’ organisational capacity and implementation of 
the Mobility Partnerships. 
It is equally difficult to come to a general conclusion 
regarding non-EU countries. Empirical research has 
shown that both Cape Verde (which signed a Mobility 
Partnership) and Senegal (which refused to sign a Mo-
bility Partnership) have limited organisational capacity 
in the area of migration: competence is shared be-
tween several ministries, with little inter-ministerial 
communication or coordination. It has been shown 
that this did not affect these countries’ preferences on 
whether or not to participate in the Mobility Partner-
ships (Reslow, 2012); however, the literature on im-
plementation suggests this limited organisational ca-
pacity will negatively affect implementation.  
5.5. Relationship between Implementing Agencies 
Three sets of actors are involved in making and imple-
menting EU external migration policy: the EU, the 
member states, and the non-EU countries. However, 
these actors are not integrated in a single hierarchical 
structure. The relationship between the EU institutions 
and the EU member states is determined by the nature 
of the policy area: competence for both migration poli-
cy and foreign policy is shared between the EU and the 
member states. The Mobility Partnerships are not le-
gally binding international agreements, but rather po-
litical declarations (Commission, 2009a, p. 4). This has 
meant that the Commission has been unable to force 
member states to implement the partnerships in a cer-
tain way. For instance, Commission officials favour 
multilateral projects over bilateral initiatives, and the 
funding allocated to Mobility Partnerships under the 
thematic programme for cooperation with non-EU 
countries in the areas of migration and asylum was 
partly conditional on partnership between member 
states (Commission, 2009b, p. 10). This inducement has 
not been sufficient, as the Mobility Partnerships are 
dominated by bilateral projects (Reslow, 2013, p. 137). 
In theory, the scoreboards might serve a “naming and 
shaming” function; however instances of projects being 
duplicated imply that member states’ officials do not 
pay too close attention to the scoreboards (p. 237). 
The relationship between the EU and the non-EU 
country is more difficult to characterise, and depends 
on the particular non-EU country concerned. Countries 
in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood with deep ties to 
the EU through several frameworks (such as the Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy) have more of a stake, in-
cluding financially, in cooperation with the EU (cf. 
Wunderlich, 2012). By contrast, countries further away 
with less well-developed relations with the EU or for 
which cooperation with the EU is not a domestic priori-
ty, may be less inclined to participate in the Mobility 
Partnerships (see e.g. Chou & Gibert [2012] on the case 
of Senegal). The implementation of Mobility Partner-
ships is overseen by local cooperation platforms, bring-
ing together representatives of the government of the 
non-EU country, member states’ embassies, and the 
EU delegation (Commission, 2009a, p. 6). An examina-
tion of the nature of the interactions within these co-
operation platforms would increase our understanding 
of the relationship between the actors in the Mobility 
Partnerships. 
5.6. Disposition of Implementing Officials 
As indicated above, three sets of actors are involved in 
implementing the Mobility Partnerships. Their disposi-
tions towards this policy instrument are likely to be 
very different. As the idea originated in the European 
Commission, officials in DG Migration and Home Affairs 
can be expected to view Mobility Partnerships positive-
ly. The Commission has long emphasised the need to 
offer non-EU countries a real incentive in return for 
their cooperation on preventing irregular migration, 
and this is what the Mobility Partnerships aim to do. 
DG Home maintains the scoreboards and has a coordi-
nating role in the implementation of the partnerships. 
However, the position of the European External Action 
Service (EEAS) should also be considered, as the EU 
delegations (which fall under the EEAS) play a key role 
in the local cooperation platforms that oversee imple-
mentation. Boswell (2003) argues that the former DG 
for Justice, Freedom and Security had very different 
priorities in relation to external migration policy than 
did the DGs for external relations and development. 
The same argument has been made with regard to na-
tional administrations: whereas interior ministries are 
“inward-looking” and might seek to prevent entry to 
the national territory through the signature of read-
mission agreements, foreign ministries might view such 
agreements suspiciously because they spoil good dip-
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lomatic relations (Pawlak, 2009; Van Selm, 2005). The 
EEAS emphasises the need to see the positive contribu-
tions of migration (EEAS, n.d.), but further research is 
required to uncover officials’ true disposition. 
The voluntary nature of the Mobility Partnerships, 
although potentially problematic in some respects (see 
e.g. section 4.5), may be linked to a positive disposition 
of implementing officials towards the policy instru-
ment. Member states that participate have voluntarily 
signed up to do so, and have been included in the poli-
cy-making process (see Reslow, 2013). In many cases 
the projects implemented under Mobility Partnerships 
are not new; rather member states have rephrased ex-
isting initiatives that they would have carried out any-
way (pp. 136-137). While this may not be very ambi-
tious (cf. Skjærseth & Wettestad, 2008), it ensures 
member states’ commitment to these projects. On the 
other hand, given the initial lack of clarity over the na-
ture and aims of the Mobility Partnerships (see section 
4.3 above), it is possible that some member states 
signed up to participate without fully understanding the 
consequences of this. Future research should try to es-
tablish links between officials’ dispositions in the deci-
sion-making stage and actual implementation process.  
Despite having signed up to the Mobility Partner-
ships, empirical research has shown that officials in 
non-EU countries are not necessarily positive about all 
aspects of this policy instrument. Cape Verdean gov-
ernment officials, for instance, were critical of the 
pressure put on them to sign the readmission agree-
ment, because it makes them responsible for readmit-
ting migrants who have merely transited through Cape 
Verde on their way to the EU (Reslow, 2013, pp. 207-
209). Given that a Mobility Partnership encompasses 
various types of projects, covering all pillars of the 
Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, implemen-
tation success will likely differ depending on the con-
tents of the projects. 
5.7. Implementation Context 
Economic, social and political conditions can all affect 
the public and political support for a policy. The Com-
mission communication on Mobility Partnerships makes 
clear that “mechanisms to facilitate economic migration 
should be based on the labour needs of interested 
member states, as assessed by them” (Commission, 
2007, p. 5). The economic crisis in Europe, which took 
hold just as the first Mobility Partnerships started to be 
signed, led to many EU member states making immigra-
tion policy more restrictive, clamping down on irregular 
migration, and encouraging return migration (e.g. IOM, 
2010; Kuptsch, 2012). In addition, the Commission 
communication stresses that projects within Mobility 
Partnerships will respect the legal principle of prefer-
ence for EU citizens (Commission, 2007, p. 5). The Mobil-
ity Partnerships are therefore being implemented in un-
favourable circumstances, as these socio-economic con-
ditions are not conducive to the creation of new chan-
nels of immigration from non-EU countries. 
The Mobility Partnerships link two issues: irregular 
migration, and legal immigration. There is plenty of 
media coverage of the problem of irregular migration 
at Europe’s borders, with recent coverage focusing on 
the fate of migrants who get into trouble in the Medi-
terranean Sea (see e.g. EUObserver, 2015; The Guardi-
an, 2015). However, legal migration is not mentioned 
as a solution to this problem. In fact, immigration from 
outside the EU is often negatively portrayed (see e.g. 
De Telegraaf, 2010; Jyllands-Posten, 2014), and recent-
ly the free movement of EU citizens has even been 
called into question (e.g. Financial Times, 2013). There 
has been no media coverage of the Mobility Partner-
ships in EU member states. 
As there has been no media coverage of the Mobili-
ty Partnerships and no public communication about 
this policy instrument by either the Commission or 
member states’ governments, there is no public 
knowledge of this policy instrument, making it impos-
sible to judge public opinion. Public opinion on irregu-
lar migration and legal immigration in general, howev-
er, may be a useful proxy measure. It is clear that many 
Europeans are sceptical about immigration from non-
EU countries (e.g. Eurobarometer, 2012, p. 20; Pew Re-
search Center, 2014), and even about free movement 
of EU citizens (e.g. Migration Watch UK, 2014). 
In non-EU countries, public opposition can be ex-
pected to the commitments on irregular migration con-
tained in a Mobility Partnership, in particular the re-
quirement to sign a readmission agreement. In 
Senegal, for example, a readmission agreement that 
had been agreed with Switzerland was not submitted 
to the parliament for ratification due to intense public 
opposition (Ellermann, 2008, p. 168). However, gov-
ernments armed with the knowledge of negative public 
opinion can choose not to sign a Mobility Partnership 
in the first place. The voluntary nature of this policy in-
strument may thus have a positive effect on the im-
plementation process. Future research should examine 
the nature of public opinion in non-EU countries that 
have agreed to a Mobility Partnership. 
The mobilisation of interest groups and elites has 
been shown to be a deciding factor in the decision-
making process on Mobility Partnerships (Reslow, 
2013). However, no general conclusion can be drawn in 
this respect as elites’ positions vary across countries: 
the French government, for instance, was very commit-
ted to getting this new policy instrument off the 
ground, whilst the Austrian government was concerned 
that Mobility Partnerships resembled the old guest-
worker schemes and therefore vigorously opposed 
them at EU level. Even within a single member state, 
elites may be up against one another: in the Nether-
lands (which has joined some of the Mobility Partner-
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ships), the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 
was opposed to participation, but could not prevent it 
in the face of support from the Ministries of Foreign Af-
fairs and Justice. The question of how the implementa-
tion process functions in countries where elites are di-
vided is a highly pertinent one for future research on 
the Mobility Partnerships. 
6. Conclusion 
This article has provided an initial conceptual assess-
ment of implementation dynamics in EU Mobility Part-
nerships. Certainly there are potential obstacles to suc-
cessful implementation, particularly the ambiguous 
nature of the policy objectives, the lack of hierarchical 
integration between implementing agencies, and the 
unfavourable political, economic and social conditions 
within which implementation is taking place. There are 
also several unknowns: a future research agenda on 
implementation of EU external migration policy should 
focus on the disposition of implementing officials, the 
nature of public opinion, and the interactions between 
the actors involved in implementation. The analysis 
furthermore found that the voluntary nature of the 
Mobility Partnership instrument may eliminate some of 
the obstacles identified by the implementation litera-
ture, in particular in the member states. Member 
states choose to participate in a Mobility Partnership 
and have been included in the policy-making process. 
They are also free to suggest projects for implementa-
tion. Implementing officials might therefore be ex-
pected to have a positive disposition towards this poli-
cy instrument. This implies that some of the 
assumptions derived from the public policy literature 
on implementation may not hold true for “new” policy 
tools, which incorporate some degree of flexibility or 
voluntary participation. Scholars studying the imple-
mentation of EU external migration policy or other in-
tergovernmental policy areas will need to adapt stand-
ard analytical frameworks in order to accurately 
capture implementation processes. 
The analysis showed that implementation may de-
pend on the specific non-EU country concerned, and 
the type of project being implemented. EU external 
migration policy includes cooperation on return and 
readmission, and therefore makes non-EU countries 
responsible for dealing with migrants. However, inter-
national organisations, NGOs and journalists have 
raised concerns about the treatment of migrants by 
some countries with which the EU cooperates (see e.g. 
IRIN, 2015 on the situation in Morocco). The question 
therefore is whether successful implementation of pol-
icy instruments such as the Mobility Partnerships is ac-
tually desirable? Future research on implementation of 
EU external migration policy should take this normative 
dimension into account by adopting a critical and hu-
man rights-centred approach to the issue. 
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